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FAA Preemption by Choice-of-Law
Provisions: Enforceable or
Unenforceable?
Puerto Rico Telephone Co., Inc. v. U.S. Phone Manufacturing Corp.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Generally, choice-of-law provisions allow corporations that do business in
several states or countries to draft their agreements and conduct their business in
accordance with the law they choose. When the choice-of-law provision is con-
tained in a contract that does not have an agreement to arbitrate, courts generally
have no qualms about enforcing them. However, when the contract does contain
an agreement to arbitrate, courts are reluctant to enforce the choice-of-law provi-
sion as to the arbitration agreement because the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)
governs arbitration agreements. This issue has been the source of much confusion
and litigation in the field of arbitration law. The issue is further confused when
the underlying issue being litigated is the standard of review that the chosen
state's laws would provide if it were applied to the agreement to arbitration. This
complex problem provokes issues concerning how good the FAA standard of
review is, how stringent courts should be in applying choice-of-law provisions to
arbitration agreements, and how parties can preempt the FAA.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In December 1988, U.S. Phone Manufacturing Corp (U.S. Phone) entered
into a contract with Puerto Rico Telephone Company, Inc. (PRTC).2 The contract
provided that U.S. Phone would supply PRTC with residential memory telephones
for five years.3 The contract was drafted by PRTC and had a choice-of-law provi-
sion stating that the contract would be "governed by and interpreted in accordance
with the laws of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.",4 The contract also provided
that "[i]f an attempt at settlement has failed, the disputes shall be finally settled
under the Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration of the American Arbitration Asso-
ciation" and that the "arbitral award shall be substantiated in writing and the find-
ings shall be final and binding for both parties."5
1. 427 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2005).
2. Id. at 23.
3. Id. U.S. Phone was awarded the bid jointly with two other companies and it was estimated that
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Various disputes arose throughout the course of performance and PRTC
eventually terminated the contract pursuant to the contract's termination clause.
6
Subsequently, U.S. Phone commenced arbitration against PRTC with the Ameri-
can Arbitration Association (AAA) on September 13, 1993. 7 As a result of the
difficulty in selecting an arbitration panel, the panel did not convene until June
1997, and then spent over two years considering the matter. 8 Finally, on March 4,
2003, the panel unanimously awarded U.S. Phone $2,552,123.99 in damages. 9
PRTC then filed a motion to vacate the arbitration award in the United States
District Court for the District of Puerto Rico on June 2, 2003.10 PRTC argued that
because the contract provided for judicial review of all errors of law in the arbitra-
tion award, the limited FAA standard of judicial review of awards should not ap-
ply.11 PRTC's motion also alleged various problems with the arbitration in gen-
eral, including "errors in the structure of the arbitration, the procedures of the
arbitration, and the ultimate findings of the arbitration."1 2 The district court held
that the FAA review standards applied and denied PRTC's motion to vacate.'
3
The district court found that PRTC's challenge to the award was not sufficient
under the FAA to allow court review. Further, the district court held that PRTC's
objections were "essentially disagreements with the arbitrators' conclusions. 14
The court granted U.S. Phone's motion to amend the judgment to reflect confir-
mation of the award, but denied U.S. Phone's request for attorneys' fees.
15
PRTC brought the instant action in the First Circuit for the United States
Court of Appeals to overturn the denial of its motion to vacate and the judgment
confirming U.S. Phone's award. 16 U.S. Phone cross-appealed the denial of attor-
neys' fees. 17 Both parties agreed that the contract was governed by the FAA and
that the FAA, by its terms, provides for very limited review of an arbitration
award.18 However, PRTC claimed the contract provided for more rigorous review
of arbitration awards than that provided for by the FAA.19
6. Id. at 24. The effective date for the termination was January 2, 1993.
7. Id.
8. Id. The length of the arbitration hearing can be explained by the fact that the hearing included
approximately 175 exhibits, 10 days of testimony, and approximately 1700 pages of documents in the
record. See id.
9. Id. The arbitrators' decision did not contain a discussion of the arbitrators' reasoning. Id.
10. Id. The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) allows a district court to vacate an arbitration award
under very limited circumstances, including fraud or corruption, evidence of partiality, arbitrator
misconduct, or an arbitrator's misuse of power. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2004).
11. U.S. Phone, 427 F.3d at 24.
12. Id. U.S. Phone also brought an action in the Southern District of New York to confirm the
award pursuant to the FAA and the two cases were ultimately consolidated. Id.
13. Id. "The district court concluded that under the FAA standard, judicial review of arbitral awards




16. Id. at 25.
17. Id.
18. Id.
Section 10 permits courts to vacate an award only: (1) Where the awards was procured by cor-
ruption, fraud, or undue mean. (2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitra-
tors, or either of them. (3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to post-
pone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and ma-
terial to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been
[Vol. 2006
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The court discussed the background and purpose of the FAA and analyzed the
effect of the choice-of-law clause regarding the appropriate standard of review.
20
The First Circuit ultimately found the choice-of-law clause was insufficient to
override the FAA and there were no other provisions that would contradict the
district court's finding that "PRTC's objections to the arbitration [were] essen-
tially disagreements with the arbitrators' conclusions., 21 The First Circuit also
affirmed the district court's decision denying U.S. Phone attorneys' fees because
PRTC's filing of its motion could not properly be categorized as frivolous. 22 Af-
firming the district court's decision not to vacate the arbitration award, the First
Circuit found that, when parties wish to displace the FAA standard of review, the
displacement can only be achieved by clear contractual language making the in-
tent of the parties "abundantly clear.,
23
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Most arbitration issues arising under the FAA have been well-settled by the
courts in the 81 years since the FAA was enacted. 24 However, one area within
commercial arbitration law that remains unsettled is the enforcement of parties'
express choice-of-law clauses by federal courts.25
When conducting international transactions, businesses often include a
choice-of-law clause as part of their arbitration agreement.26 This clause is of
particular importance to both of the parties because it designates the law govern-
ing the parties' contractual agreement as a whole.27 The problem with these
clauses stems from the fact that federal courts, after historically ignoring such
clauses and applying federal law, have recently "adopted an approach that upheld
the autonomous decision of the parties to incorporate specific rules of arbitration
procedure through the inclusion of an express choice-of-law clause within the
terms of their agreement."
28
In an attempt to resolve this dilemma, the United States Supreme Court in
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.,29 articulated an objective test that
focuses on a determination of the "specific intent" of the parties at the time the
agreement was entered into. 30 To satisfy this test the clause must state an un-
prejudiced. (4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them at a
mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.
Id. (citing 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2000)).
19. Id. at 26.
20. See id. at 26-30.
21. Id. at 32.
22. Id. at 33. The court stated that attomeys' fees would only be awarded for either obstinate con-
duct or frivolous litigation. Id.
23. Id. See also id. at 29, n.5.
24. Jessica Thrope, A Question of Intent: Choice of Law and the International Arbitration Agree-
ment, DiSP. RESOL. J., Nov. 1999, at 16, 18.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 19.
27. Id. at 18.
28. Id.
29. 514 U.S. 52 (1995).
30. Thrope, supra note 24, at 18 (citing Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 59).
No. 2]
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equivocal expression to incorporate the chosen law's procedural arbitration rules
into the parties' arbitration agreement.
31
An issue that often stems from the choice-of-law dilemma is determining the
appropriate standard of review. Generally, the "standards of review for arbitral
awards are defined in the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and are extremely nar-
row., 32 Problems arise when parties attempt to contract for more rigorous review
of arbitration awards through choice-of-law clauses. Interpreting choice-of-law
clauses and applying the appropriate standard of review in arbitration disputes has
caused many problems and has led to "complex divisions even among individual
circuits." 33 It is important to understand how courts have dealt with these issues
and the trends they are following.
A. Choice-of-Law Clauses and the Courts' Dilemma of Enforcement
One of the most oft-cited cases dealing with choice-of-law clauses in arbitra-
tion agreements is Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of the
Leland Stanford Junior University.34 In Volt, the parties to the transaction agreed
to arbitrate all disputes arising out of the contract and that "[t]he Contract shall be
governed by the law of the place where the Project is located. 35 Volt, under the
terms of the agreement, was supposed to install a series of electrical systems on
Stanford's campus. 36 A dispute arose and Volt invoked arbitration.37  Stanford
countered by filing an action in state court and moved to stay arbitration pending
resolution of related litigation pursuant to California Rules of Civil Procedure.
38
Volt argued that the stay was preempted by section 4 of the FAA.39 The court
ultimately concluded that even if the FAA preempted the state statute as applied to
other parties, the choice-of-law clause in the contract demonstrated that the parties
agreed to be governed by the statute. 4° The Court rejected Volt's argument that
the choice-of-law clause was to be construed as incorporating only substantive
law.4 1 Essentially, the Supreme Court reasoned that because the FAA requires
courts to enforce privately negotiated agreements to arbitrate, the choice-of-law
clause made state rules governing the conduct of arbitration applicable.42 This
31. Id. (citing Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 59).
32. Jonathan R. Bunch, Note, Arbitration Clauses Should Be Enforced According to Their Terms-
Except When They Shouldn't Be: The Ninth Circuit Limits Parties' Ability to Contract for Standards of
Review ofArbitration Awards, 2004 J. DiSP. RESOL. 461,461 (2005).
33. Id.
34. 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
35. Id. at 470. The project was located in California. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 470-71.
39. Id. at 471 n.2. 9 U.S.C. § 4 states that:
[a] party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate under a writ-
ten agreement for arbitration may petition any United States district court which, save for such
agreement, would have jurisdiction under Title 28, in a civil action or in admiralty of the subject
matter of a suit arising out of the controversy between the parties, for an order directing that such
arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement.
9 U.S.C. § 4 (2000).
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decision marked the "first U.S. case to favor application of an express clause to
the procedural aspects of arbitration instead of federal substantive arbitration law
under the FAA.",
4?
In a more recent case, Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.,44 the
United States Supreme Court came to a slightly different conclusion regarding a
choice-of-law clause. In Mastrobuono, the Court stressed that the choice-of-law
clause and the arbitration clause in the contract should be read separately, not
conjunctively. 45  The issue in this case was whether the choice-of-law clause
trumped the arbitration clause; under New York law,46 punitive damages were
barred for this type of dispute, but the FAA allowed for recovery of punitive dam-
ages.47 Therefore, if the two clauses had been read together, a huge ambiguity
would have existed as to whether punitive damages were to be awarded. To avoid
this ambiguity, the Court reiterated the established rule that when there is ambigu-
ity as to the scope of arbitrable issues, they are to be resolved in favor of arbitra-
tion.48 This case was the Court's attempt to limit and define the scope of choice-
of-law clauses after Volt.4 9
B. Effect of Mastrobuono
The Supreme Court's decision in Mastrobuono has had a significant impact
on subsequently decided cases. Courts have been reluctant to enforce choice-of-
law provisions in arbitration agreements unless the agreement contains an "un-
equivocal expression to incorporate the chosen law's procedural arbitration
rules."
50
In Roadway Package System, Inc. v. Kayser,5 1 the Third Circuit stated that
"the presence of a generic choice-of-law clause tells us little (if anything) about
whether contracting parties intended to opt out of the FAA's default standards and
incorporate ones borrowed from state law." 52 The court went on to hold that the
"generic choice-of-law clause" is insufficient by itself to support a finding that the
parties intended to opt out of the FAA's default rules.53
43. Thrope, supra note 24, at 78.
44. 514 U.S. 52 (1995).
45. Id. at 64. "[Ihe choice-of-law provision covers the rights and duties of the parties, while the
arbitration clause covers arbitration; neither sentence intrudes upon the other." Id.
46. New York was the state listed in the choice-of-law clause. Id. at 52.
47. Thrope, supra note 24, at 82.
48. Id. The court also noted that as a basic premise to contract law, that ambiguous language within
an agreement is interpreted against the drafting party. Id.
49. Id. at 81.
50. Id. at 18.
51. 257 F.3d 287 (3d Cir. 2001).
52. Id. at 288-89. Based on the court's reasoning, the choice-of-law clause was generic because it
did not explicitly state that it was to override the FAA default rules for arbitration.
53. id. at 289. The court then listed the reasoning for its decision not to recognize the generic
choice-of-law clause by stating that the rule will: "(1) ensure that parties who have never thought about
the issue will not be found to have elected out of the FAA's default regime; (2) be comparatively
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In PaineWebber Inc. v. Elahi,54 the First Circuit held that these generic
choice-of-law clauses are not applicable because there is a strong federal policy
requiring limited review. 55 The First Circuit stressed that this is particularly so
when the state law at issue is "specifically and solely applicable to arbitration
agreements. 56
Volt and Mastrobuono are both still good law, so the issue facing most courts
dealing with an arbitration dispute involving a choice-of-law clause is whether the
case is more like Volt or more like Mastrobuono. If the case is more like Volt, it is
more likely the court will enforce the choice-of-law provision. Conversely, if the
case is more like Mastrobuono, it is more likely the court will not enforce the
choice-of-law provision.
C. Standard of Review
In 1925 the FAA was enacted. 57 In 1947, it was reenacted and codified as Ti-
tle 9 of the United States Code.58 The FAA's "purpose was to reverse the long-
standing judicial hostility to arbitration agreements that had existed at English
common law and had been adopted by American courts, and to place arbitration
agreements upon the same footing as other contracts., 59 Two policies underlying
the FAA include: (1) "as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope
of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration;" 6 and (2) the "con-
gressional desire to enforce agreements into which parties had entered.",
6
'
These two policies may come into conflict when an arbitration agreement
adopts a particular arbitration rule different from that of the FAA standard, even
where federal law governs. The argument is that "the agreement should be en-
forced according to its terms, and that the specific rule chosen by the parties
should prevail over the FAA standard.
' 62
Generally, standards of review for arbitral awards are extremely narrow as de-
fined by the terms of the FAA.63 However, with the rising popularity of parties
submitting disputes to arbitration, "the issue of whether parties can contractually
expand the standard of review has become extremely unclear, with complex divi-
sions even among individual circuits. ' 64 Part of this conflict stems from courts
interpreting the holding in Volt to mean that because parties' agreements should
be enforced according to their terms, they should, therefore, be free to contract for
non-statutory standards of review.
65
The United States Supreme Court has yet to decide whether parties can con-
tract for a standard of review greater than the FAA standards. Therefore, when
54. 87 F.3d 589 (1st Cir. 1996).
55. Id. at 593.
56. Id.
57. P.R. Tel. Co. v. U.S. Phone Mfg. Corp., 427 F.3d 21,26 (1st Cir. 2005).
58. Id.
59. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991).
60. Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983).
61. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 220 (1985).
62. P.R. Tel. Co., 427 F.3d at 27.
63. Id. at 25.
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the issue arises, there is a split of authority as to whether expansion is or is not
permissible. For instance, in Fils et Cables D'Acier de Lens v. Midland Metals
Corp.,66 the Southern District of New York reasoned that, as long as there are no
jurisdictional orpublic policy barriers, parties should be allowed to alter the stan-• 7
dards of review. In contrast, the Seventh Circuit became one of the first federal
circuits to prohibit contractual expansion of the standard for review of arbitral
awards beyond the terms of the FAA in Chicago Typographical Union No. 16 v.
Chicago Sun-Times, Inc.
68
In Chicago Typographical Union, the parties had not actually agreed to ex-
pand the standard of review of the arbitral award, but rather the losing party
sought to have the award vacated due to the arbitrator's error in interpreting the
contract.69 Although this case differs in that there was not a provision in the con-
tract to expand the standard of review, Judge Posner explicitly stated in the opin-
ion that contracting for judicial review of an arbitration award was impossible.7 °
The court pointed out that agreements to arbitrate a labor or other contract are "a
contractual commitment to abide by an arbitrator's interpretation.",
7
'
There are only a few cases in which courts have held that parties explicitly
contracted for more searching judicial review of arbitral awards than that provided
for in the FAA.72 In Gateway Techonlogies, Inc. v. MCI Telecommunications
Corp.,73 the Fifth Circuit held that language stating that "[t]he arbitration decision
shall be final and binding on both parties, except that errors of law shall be subject
to appeal, 74 was enough to trump the FAA standard. The Fifth Circuit also found
the language in Harris v. Parker College of Chiropractic75 sufficient to trump the
FAA standard when the contract stated that "each party shall retain his right to
appeal any question of law.
76
More recently, in Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Services, Inc., 77
the Ninth Circuit declared that its previous decision in Lapine Technology Corp. v.
Kyocera Corp.,78 allowing parties to expand the standard of review was errone-
ous. The court held that "private parties may not contractually impose their own
standard on the courts., 79 The court reasoned that "Congress had provided the
standard of review for arbitral awards in the FAA, and that contractual provisions
providing for judicial review on any other grounds than those set forth in the FAA
were invalid. 80
66. 584 F. Supp. 240 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
67. Id. at 244.
68. 935 F.2d 1501 (7th Cir. 1991).
69. Id. at 1505.
70. Id.
71. Bunch, supra note 32, at 467.
72. P.R. Tel. Co., 427 F.3d at 31.
73. 64 F.3d 993 (5th Cir. 1995).
74. Id. at 996.
75. 286 F.3d 790 (5th Cir. 2002).
76. Id. at 793.
77. 341 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2003).
78. 130 F.3d 884, 888 (9th Cir. 1997).
79. Kyocera, 341 F.3d at 994.
80. Bunch, supra note 32, at 464.
No. 2]
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IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Puerto Rico Telephone Company, Inc. v. U.S. Phone Manufacturing
Corp.,8 the First Circuit Court of Appeals considered the enforceability of a
choice-of-law provision, which, if applied, would require a more expansive stan-
82dard of review than that provided for in the FAA. After analyzing case law on
the issue, the court ultimately held that the choice-of-law provision was insuffi-
cient to override the FAA.8
3
The court first discussed the appropriate standard of judicial review for arbi-
tration disputes and stated that neither party disputed that the contract was gov-
erned by the FAA.84 The court then considered the circumstances under which
arbitration awards can be vacated under section 10 of the FAA. 85 The court fi-
nally relied on two First Circuit decisions 86 and held that section 10 "carefully
limits judicial intervention to instances where the arbitration has been tainted in
certain specific ways... [and] contains no express ground upon which an award
can be overturned because it rests on garden-variety factual or legal [errors,]" and
therefore, only where there is "manifest disregard for the law" can an award be
vacated.87 Because PRTC contended that the parties contracted for a more rigor-
ous review of arbitration awards than that provided for by the FAA, the court had
to determine the enforceability of the clause before deciding the standard of re-
view issue.
88
In considering the choice-of-law issue, the court examined the two leading
U.S. Supreme Court decisions on the issue: Volt and Mastrobuono.89 Summariz-
ing Mastrobuono, the court stated that "a choice-of-law clause, standing alone,
generally will not be interpreted to require the application of state law restricting
'the authority of arbitrators.' 90 In summarizing Volt, the court stated that "appli-
cation of state law rules is appropriate only when there is no conflicting federal
policy."91
The First Circuit then concluded that this case is more parallel to Mastro-
buono than to Volt because the policies of the FAA are implicated here.9 2 The
court quickly shot down PRTC's argument that the choice-of-law provision re-
quires application of "Puerto Rican law to determine whether the contract requires
more searching judicial review... than that provided for in the FAA" because the
"extremely limited judicial review contemplated by the FAA clearl' implicates
the federal policy favoring final resolution of disputes by arbitration." 3 The court
81. 427 F.3d 21 (lst Cir. 2005).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 33.
84. Id. at 25.
85. Id.
86. Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1990); Wonderland Greyhound Park, Inc. v.
Autotote Sys., Inc, 274 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2001).
87. P. R. Tel. Co., 427 F.3d at 25 (quoting Advest, 914 F.2d at 8 and Wonderland, 274 F.3d at 35-
36).
88. P. R. Tel. Co., 427 F.3d at 26-27.
89. See supra Part LI.A.
90. P. R. Tel. Co., 427 F.3d at 28.
91. Id. at 28-29.
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found the choice-of-law provision "insufficient to render applicable Puerto Rican
law concerning the scope of judicial review." 94 Before moving on, the court con-
cluded that absent an "abundantly clear" intent by the parties to invoke state law
providing for more searching judicial review, the FAA will not be precluded in the
court's interpretation of the agreement.
95
The next issue for the court was the appropriate standard of review. PRTC
argued that even if federal law was applied, more searching judicial review should
be explicitly evidenced by the contract itself.96 The court, citing Kyocera, stated
that "private parties may not contractually impose their own standard on the
courts. 97 The court concluded that even if the language was sufficient under
Puerto Rican Law, it was not nearly enough to satisfy the explicit language re-
quired by federal law to trump the FAA standard of review. 98
The last issue the court faced was the cross-appeal by U.S. Phone for the
award of attorneys' fees.9 9 U.S. Phone relied on the opinion of the district court
stating that "[t]he mere filing of this motion controverts the purpose of the Federal
Arbitration Act and is a waste of time and resources of this Court."'' The court
determined that Puerto Rican law governs the question of fees and that U.S. Phone
failed to prove that PRTC's claim was either "(1) obstinate conduct or (2) frivo-
lous litigation."'10 1 The court concluded that the district court acted within its dis-
cretion in disallowing the award of attorneys' fees to U.S. Phone.
0 2
V. COMMENT
When the courts discuss a "generic choice-of-law clause" they are speaking
of a choice-of-law provision that is contained in a contractual agreement which
also contains an agreement to arbitrate. 10 3 In a normal contract, this provision
would accomplish all of the parties' goals with respect to the laws governing their
relationship.1 4 However, when an agreement to arbitrate is also contained in a
contract, the courts treat the arbitration agreement separate and distinct from all
other provisions in the contract. 0 5 The reason the arbitration agreement gets this
separate treatment is because Congress enacted the FAA to govern arbitration
agreements. 1°6 This is a confusing rule that leads to costly litigation for many
parties contracting for arbitration. Most parties probably intuitively believe that
any provision (i.e., one specifying choice of law) applies to the whole contract and
does not exclude other provisions (i.e., requiring arbitration). If courts gave more
94. Id. at 30.
95. Id. at 29.
96. Id. at 30.
97. Id. See also Kyocera Corp., 341 F.3d at 994.
98. P.R. Tel. Co., 427 F.3d at 31. See supra Part ll.C. (discussing cases where the court held that
the language in the parties' contract was explicit enough to trump the FAA standard).
99. P. R. Tel. Co., 427 F.3d at 32.
100. Id. at 33.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See P. R. Tel. Co., 427 F.3d at 27-30.
104. See Fin. One Pub. Co. Ltd. v. Lehman Bros. Special Fin., Inc., 414 F.3d 325, 333-34 (2d Cir.
2005) (discussing the enforceability of choice-of-law provisions).
105. Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 63-64.
106. See supra Part I]I.C. (discussing Congress's purpose for enacting the FAA).
No. 21
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of a comprehensive effect to choice-of-law provisions, it would help parties in the
contracting process tremendously because they would not be so concerned about
the exact wording of the choice-of-law provision. Parties would all be on the
same footing and know that if the contract contains a choice-of-law provision,
then it applies to the entire contract and every provision contained in the contract.
In deciding Puerto Rico Telephone Co., Inc. v. U.S. Phone Manufacturing
Corp.,10 7 the First Circuit was guided by logic and its conclusions were supported
by current caselaw. However, the opinion illustrates the confusion many parties
still have regarding choice-of-law provisions in arbitration agreements. Knowing
what language in the provision will preempt the FAA seems to be the source of
most of the confusion. Contemplating this issue begs the questions: Is the review
provided for in the FAA sufficient?; Should courts be so stringent in the enforce-
ment of these provisions in arbitration agreements?; What exactly must the
agreement state in order for the choice-of-law provision to preempt the FAA?
A. Is the FAA standard of review sufficient?
One matter worth considering is whether the FAA standard of review is suffi-
cient.' 0 8 The first criticism is often that the FAA standard of review is extremely
narrow.l19 The fact that the standard of review is narrow does not appear to be
that big of a problem in jurisdictions that allow contractual expansion," 0 but in
jurisdictions that do not allow contractual expansion, it seems unfair that the par-
ties must deal with a standard that is so narrow.
One argument in favor of the FAA standard of review is that parties contract-
ing for arbitration are agreeing to settle their disputes outside of court; therefore,
the standard for allowing them to bring a dispute in court should be narrow. Fur-
ther, parties should know the standard of review of arbitral awards prior to agree-
ing to arbitration and should be held to that standard regardless of whether or not
their jurisdiction allows contractual expansion of the standard.
However, the standard of review provided by the FAA has been described as
the "narrowest known to the law."'' Leaving losing parties in an arbitration pro-
ceeding with so few options is not just. There are many circumstances under
which an arbitral proceeding could be flawed and not fall within the circumstances
providing review under the FAA. The standard of review should be narrower for
arbitration than regular litigation, but the current standard is too narrow. If the
standard of review were the same as that provided in regular litigation, it would
cut away at the efficiency of resolving disputes that arbitration provides. There-
fore, the FAA standard of review should be somewhere in between the current
FAA standard and that of regular litigation.
In Puerto Rico Telephone Company, 12 the First Circuit did not allow the ex-
pansion of the standard of review because they found the choice-of-law provision
107. 427 F.3d 21 (lst Cir. 2005).
108. See supra note 18 (discussing FAA standard of review).
109. Bunch, supra note 32.
110. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
11. Litvak Packing Co. v. United Food & Commercial Workers, Local Union No. 7, 886 F.2d 275,
276 (10th Cir. 1989).
112. P.R. Tel. Co., 427 F.3d at 21.
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unenforceable as to the arbitration agreement. 1 3 Given the facts of the case, this
seems to be consistent with other case law on the matter, but that does not make it
just. While the First Circuit had no control over the standard of review provided
by the FAA, they did have control over the choice-of-law provision, and could
have given PRTC the Puerto Rican standard of review they contracted for.
B. Should Courts Be So Stringent in the Enforcement of Choice-of-Law
Provisions in Arbitration Agreements?
There is only so far a party can go in writing its arbitration agreement to ex-
plicitly preempt the FAA. Based on the current case law, the best advice appears
to be to have the agreement state that the choice-of-law provision is intended to
preempt the FAA's standard of review and that the arbitration agreement's stan-
dard of review will be the standard of review of the chosen state.
It is actually the FAA that gives parties the ability to contract around the
FAA's standards in the first place. 14 Sections 2 and 4 of the FAA allow a party to
an arbitration agreement to "petition any United States district court ... for an
order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such
agreement." ' 15 This appears to give the agreement superiority over everything
else, but for some reason choice-of-law clauses have been treated as separate from
the arbitration agreement when the provisions are within the same contract.
One could conclude that by making it so difficult to preempt the FAA with a
choice-of-law provision, courts are simply avoiding having to review arbitration
awards. Initially, it seems undesirable for the courts to avoid reviewing awards.
However, avoiding costly litigation is one of the main reasons parties agree to
arbitrate, and making certain that review is rare helps to ensure that goal is
reached. Also, by making the parties explicitly state that their intent to preempt
the FAA erases any ambiguity that would normally exist when there is a choice-
of-law provision and an agreement to arbitrate all within the same contract.
The concurrence by Third Circuit Judge Ambro in Roadway Package System
Inc., suggests that courts should not be so stringent in enforcing choice-of-law
provisions in arbitration." 6 Judge Ambro looked at this issue from the other di-
rection and reasoned that "absent express preemption by the FAA," the chosen
state's laws shall govern the arbitration section. 117 This is basically the same ar-
gument courts generally make about why the choice-of-law provision should not
preempt the FAA. While this is a candid argument, it is not without problems.
One major problem with this argument is that requiring Congress to amend the
FAA statutes is a lot of trouble. Currently, under the FAA, parties are required to
be more educated as to arbitration and this provides for more efficient contracting.
However, if courts followed Judge Ambro's reasoning it would also lead to more
efficient contracting because all parties would know that a choice-of-law provi-
sion applies to all sections of the contract and the FAA would not need to be
amended unless Congress disliked the results.
113. Id. at 31.
114. Volt, 489 U.S. at 476.
115. Id. at 474 (quoting 9 U.S.C. §§ 2, 4 (2000)).
116. See Roadway Package Sys. Inc., 257 F.3d 289 (Ambro, J., concurring).
117. Id. at 308.
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Courts should not be so stringent in the enforcement of choice-of-law provi-
sions in arbitration, especially when it is remembered that the FAA was originally
used as a default to fill in agreements. Why should it be so hard to preempt some-
thing that was merely intended as a default? As previously stated, the FAA gives
parties the power to have their agreement enforced according to its terms, and if
one of those terms involves a choice-of-law provision, then that should apply to
the whole contract, including the agreement to arbitrate. In Volt, the Court stated
that "[t]here is no federal policy favoring arbitration under a certain set of proce-
dural rules; the federal policy is simply to ensure the enforceability, according to
their terms, of private agreements to arbitrate.' 18 While Judge Ambro's reason-
ing may be a little extreme in requiring the FAA to preempt the choice-of-law
provision, it would be more logical and result in more efficient contracting if
courts followed this reasoning.
C. What language is required to preempt the FAA?
In Roadway Package System, Inc. v. Kayser,' 9 the Third Circuit was very
clear that a "generic choice-of-law clause" is insufficient by itself to support a
finding that the parties intended to opt out of the FAA's default rules. 20 Mastro-
buono articulated that a choice-of-law clause, in a contract that also provides for
arbitration, will be read in isolation, thereby keeping the FAA default rules for the
arbitration and applying the choice-of-law clause to the rights and duties of the
parties.
121
While these cases go far in explaining what language does not work to pre-
empt the FAA with a choice-of-law provision, they do little in explaining what
language will work for parties attempting to preempt the FAA. The Fifth Circuit
has allowed parties to preempt the FAA's standard of review with explicit lan-
guage reserving the parties' right to appeal the arbitration decision.' 22 However,
neither of these Fifth Circuit cases attempted to expand the standard of review by
using a choice-of-law provision; there does not appear to be a reason why using a
choice-of-law provision to expand the standard of review would have any signifi-
cance on how explicit the language must be. Another consideration to keep in
mind when analyzing these cases is that they were both decided by the Fifth Cir-
cuit and there really is no way of knowing whether other jurisdictions would give
the same effect to the language in those agreements that the Fifth Circuit did. The
only rule that seems to hold true, in all jurisdictions, is that the language intended
to preempt the FAA must be explicit.
In Puerto Rico Telephone Company, Inc., the First Circuit concluded that the
case was more similar to Mastrobuono than to Volt and, therefore, read the
choice-of-law provision and the arbitration provision separately.' 23 In doing so,
the FAA default standard of review was applied to the agreement. This does not
118. Volt, 489 U.S. at 469.
119. Roadway Package Sys., Inc., 257 F.3d at 287.
120. Id. at 288-89.
121. Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 64.
122. See supra Part Il.C. (discussing cases in which the Fifth Circuit allowed the parties to preempt
the FAA).
123. P.R. TeL Co., 427 F.3d at 29.
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seem like a very just decision. The parties' contract stated that it "shall be gov-
erned by and interpreted in accordance with the laws of the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico.' ' 24 Nowhere does the contract state that the FAA rules shall apply to
the arbitration agreement within the contract. The choice-of-law provision states
that the "contract" shall be governed by Puerto Rican law, and that should mean
the whole contract and everything contained in it. This may be contrary to most
of the case law on this issue, but it is a more logical conclusion.
Another phrase courts use to explain the language required to preempt the
FAA is, "abundantly clear." The Eighth Circuit stated in UHC Management Co.
v. Computer Sciences Corp.,125 that they "[would] not interpret an arbitration
agreement as precluding the application of the FAA unless the parties' intent that
the agreement be so construed is abundantly clear."' 126 Whether this means that
language used in Gateway Technologies and Harris is "abundantly clear" is un-
known. 127 However, it seems unreasonable for a court to require more than an
express reservation of a party's right to appeal. An express statement that the
laws of the chosen state are to preempt the FAA should be more than sufficient.
It appears that the problems illustrated by Puerto Rico Telephone Co., Inc.
can be alleviated either by Congress amending the FAA to provide for a broader
standard of review of arbitral decisions, or by courts applying choice-of-law pro-
visions to contracts as a whole, including the agreement to arbitration. The latter
appears to be the easiest alternative because any amendment to the FAA would
likely provoke more litigation until the meaning of the amended version was set-
tled.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although it appears that courts, including the First Circuit, will allow parties
to preempt the FAA with a choice-of-law provision, the parties must be very ex-
plicit in stating that they intend to preempt the FAA. This explicit language re-
quirement has caused a lot of litigation and probably will continue until the high
court finally settles the matter and defines the explicit language required to pre-
empt the FAA, or acknowledges that it will not preempt the FAA when it comes
to expanding standard of review. Until then, courts will have somewhat broad
discretion in determining what language is explicit enough to preempt the FAA.
With the FAA standard of review being so narrow, it is unacceptable for courts to
be so stringent in applying choice-of-law provisions to arbitration agreements that
are both within the same contract. If every court would consistently apply the
choice-of-law provision to the agreement to arbitration, it would result in less
confusion and more efficient resolution in arbitration.
Ross BALL
124. Id. at 23.
125. 148 F.3d 992 (8th Cir. 1998).
126. Id. at 997.
127. See supra Part mfl.C. (discussing these cases).
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